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As almost all sociologists I developed by training a deeply seated allergic 
reaction to any biological explanations of social issues. The typical line of 
causation, which Lakatos calls biological imperialism in his paper on biology 
and sociology (Lakatos, 2008, p. 157), claims to have found rock hard 
evidence of this or that be it is the biologically given nature of gender roles, IQ 
differences of races, altruistic behavior among people sharing the same genes 
and so on. Also in popular thinking there is too much ‘naturalization’ going 
on about our intrinsic human nature for my liking. Being natural is something 
which everybody should strive for nowadays as if there is an independent 
yardstick of naturalness and as if what is generally considered the very core of 
being human would not be historically and culturally context dependent.
However, this is just one side of the story since by teaching social theory 
I am also aware of the fact how difficult it is for social theorists to deal with 
issues such as the body, the embodiment of knowledge, unconscious or 
semi-conscious strategies and the topic of intersubjectivity (shiLLing, 2001; 
CrossLey, 2005). Also in micro sociological terms, in face-to-face contexts we 
do not react to each other as disembodied agents with intentions and interests 
but constantly ‘read’ the faces of others and interpret more or less subtle signs 
of bodily gestures (rogers, 2003, p. 106-114). It also should be mentioned that 
sociology has a long history of intimate relationship with biology as numerous 
‘sociological’ concepts show it such as social morphology, function, systems 
and the environment, interpenetration, autopoesis and so on (PáL, 2001, 2004; 
BaLogh & karáCsony, 2000, pp. 269-295). 
1  Gábor Király is senior lecturer at the  Budapest Business School; e-mail: kiraly.gabor@pszfb.
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So, when I found Franks’ book titled Neurosociology I was quite interested 
as to whether this book is another reductionist attempt to simplify complex 
social processes into straightforward biological principles, or alternatively, it 
is a way to ‘bring the body back’ into social scientific thinking. As a matter 
of fact, Franks is aware of some sociologists’ biased attitudes towards such 
matters, so he starts with distancing his approach from reductionist biological 
explanations. The basis of his approach lies in social neuroscience, a new 
special subfield of neuroscience, which attempts to understand the biological 
processes of the body in terms of their role in social interactions and 
cooperation. 
Franks intends to integrate the findings of this new socially oriented field 
of neuroscience into sociology in general and symbolic interactionism in 
particular. The main argument goes that our brain is inherently social in both 
its evolution and its functioning. In this review I will first give an overview 
of the evolution of social brain hypothesis and then I will move on to the 
functioning of this concept focusing on topics related to intersubjectivity. In 
the last section, I will attempt to delineate a few tentative possibilities of 
convergences between sociology and social neuroscience following the lead 
in Franks’ book. 
thE Evolution of thE social brain
One of the main questions concerning the evolution of the human brain 
is about the source of human intelligence. There is a popular narrative 
characterizing both the scientific and the lay thinking claiming that our 
intelligence evolved through our tool-making practices thereby adapting to 
the harsh conditions of our environment. However, there is an alternative 
explanation which gradually gains acceptance among neuroscientist. The 
argument is that if we want to understand the complexity of human thought 
we need to go beyond the depths of the individual brain. Therefore, the origins 
of human intelligence must be in external conditions of social life.
Our ancestors having been driven out of forests (perhaps by the climate) 
to savannahs might have developed the necessary practical intelligence and 
emotional control to establish and live in a complex network of cooperation 
with fellow members of their species. Very intelligent but separate individuals, 
however sophisticated their tools were, would have been far more vulnerable 
than organized groups defending themselves and hunting or foraging together.
According to this line of argument, the other important factor greatly 
influencing our general intelligence was group size. There is a clear 
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relationship between intelligence, brain size and the number of members in 
the group in the animal kingdom. The greater the number of like individuals 
with whom an animal deals on a routine basis, the more intelligent it is since it 
needs more elaborate cognitive capacities to identify and track changes in the 
‘social current’. As Christakis and Fowler (2010, p. 267) pointed out in their 
book about social networks titled Connected, primates were the first type of 
species which started a close knit connection and cooperative relationship 
not only with their mating partners but also same sex individuals.2 Just like 
in a networking site such as Facebook, relationships with new ‘significant 
others’ open the possibility of new relationships. If one relationship has been 
established, it is very likely that an individual gets to know the friends of his 
or her friend as well. The argument is that to keep track of social life with all 
its drama and entangled relationships we, and of course our close relatives the 
other primates, needed to develop a far more effective cognitive system. But 
why is it difficult to manage a larger group?3 The answer lies in the fact that 
the more members are in the group, the more complex social living becomes. 
Blackburn point this out in relation to moral dilemmas represented in art but 
also in soap operas:
“Drama, literature, and poetry all work out ideas of standards of 
behaviour and their consequences. This is overtly so in great art. 
But it shows itself just as unmistakably in our relentless appetite for 
gossip and the confession shows and the soap opera. Should Arlene 
tell Charlene that Rod knows that Tod kissed Darlene, although 
nobody has told Marlene? Is it required by loyalty to Charlene or 
would it be a betrayal of Darlene? Watch on (blacKburn, 2009, p. 
4-5).”
Of course, our ancestors also needed to survive in harsh conditions so tool-
making and intelligence must also be in close relationship. Yet, the emerging 
consensus is that social intelligence was the first on the scene and made tool 
production possible. Tool-making presupposes self-conscious control of our 
biological impulses. This control could only have developed through the 
requirement of living together and cooperating, in other words, its source is 
in the social environment. Using Franks’ own words:
2 The original argument is from Robin Dunbar and Susanne Shultz primatologists (2007).
3  Did we really need to develop new cognitive capacities when the group size went up let’s say 
from five to ten? There is only one possible relationship between two people, three between 
three, six between four and ten between five. The number of potential relationships increases 
exponentially with group size (Christakis & FowLer, 2010, p. 267)
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“Current thinking is that the pressure to select for intelligence came 
from the demands of the social organization. Especially important 
was the advantage given to those who could anticipate the reactions 
of others and foresee the consequences of their social actions. (…) 
The real ‘engine in our evolution’, they say, was the signaling of 
affect which underpins a sense of shared reality – what sociologists 
see as ‘intersubjectivity’ (FranKs, 2010, p. 31).”
The development of language is also reconsidered in the light of the above 
mentioned arguments. It is common knowledge that the “evolution of Homo 
sapiens’ brain is integrally tied to a pressing need to communicate, which 
developed over millions of years into spoken language” (Franks, 2010, p. 32). 
Social neuroscience’s position is that the brain’s organization and language 
were not developed for the purpose of rational decision-making. Instead, 
it developed in order to enhance human connectivity, to put it differently, 
language, first and foremost, is about maintaining group coherence and not a 
way of analyzing facts of the environment better. 
What is the precursor of language then? In primate behavior, group 
coherence is maintained and strengthened in the practice of grooming. If a 
member of a chimpanzee group loses its partner for example, it starts to groom 
others in the group more thereby strengthening other ties to deal with the loss. 
What about humans? As Christakis and Fowler asks should you “groom your 
friends, or just talk to them?” (2010, p. 276)? 
From an evolutionary point of view, language is far more efficient than 
grooming. We can only groom one friend, colleague, student or professor 
at a time while we can speak to a lot of them at the same time (although in 
a conversation there are also limits in the size of the circle we can maintain 
effective communication with). This means that language allows for larger 
and more complex social structure. Imagine a university, or any institution 
for that matter, where social relationships are maintained by grooming. We 
would spend most of our time grooming and not working too much.4 Instead 
of paying too much attention of what tasty little thingies lie under our fellow 
group members’ hair we speak to them. All in all, in this regard, language’s 
primary function is about social cohesion:
“Whereas chimps spend 20% of their time grooming each other, 
humans spend 20% of their time in social interaction, mostly in 
4  However, the fact that we do not groom, not in public spaces at least, does not mean automatically 
that we spend more time with work. Anecdotal evidence shows that time spent with work might 
be in negative relationship with frequent language use.
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conversation, much of which is about each other. Two-thirds of 
human conversation pertains not to technological problems or 
rational decision-making, but to gossip about other people (FranKs, 
2010, p. 30).”
Language then is a much more efficient alternative to achieve the necessary 
social cohesion in a large group. There is a positive feedback loop here between 
group size, cognitive capacity and social sensitivity. While in the past, group 
size was determined by the time necessary for grooming, with the appearance 
of language the size of a community was no longer constrained by this factor. 
This is also critical to the development of further cognitive capacity. 
With language use community size went up, which caused further 
development in cognitive capabilities and social sensitivity necessary to deal 
with the larger number of people in the social network. According to this 
perspective, the large human brain evolved not to solve relatively simple 
problems associated with tool use but to deal with the complexities posed by 
social living (i.e. see above the dilemma of Marlene, Charlene and Arlene). 
Moreover, most of the time we use our brain specifically for that purpose as 
the next section will point that out. 
thE functioninG of thE social brain 
 
Development of the social brain
Our brain is also inherently social in its functioning in everyday life. First 
and foremost, it is social because it needs other brains to develop to a fully 
functional brain. However nice Kipling’s story about Mowgli may be, no child 
raised by wolfs, or any other animal for that matter, will be human in the sense 
that he or she will not be able to interact fully and share a common reality 
with others. A 21st century version of the feral child’s story is Danielle’s case. 
Danielle is a little American girl who was raised in darkness and isolation 
till age 7 when she was found by the police.5 Since she passed the age when 
5  I found Danielle story in a magazine in my sisters’ temporarily empty flat when I ‘fled’ there from 
my inquisitive little daughter to work on this review. The interesting thing was that this magazine 
was there for 2 years but I have never once realized that it might be interesting. Yet, when I 
read about the nature and development of the social brain suddenly I ‘discovered’ that it was 
there all along. My previous and present actions made it possible for me to discover that article. 
This is what the author, following the ideas of the pragmatists like Dewey and Mead, calls 
the primacy of action in perception. While the original behaviorist understanding of the 
relationship between perception and action is subsequential (stimulus à conscious thought 
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human relationships are established, she shows the same symptoms as autistic 
children.6 So our brain can only develop and maintain its full capacity in a 
social context. In relation with this, Franks quotes Leslie Brothers, the first 
neuroscientist focusing exclusively on the social nature of the brain:
“…while our individual brains are singular and self-contained, the 
processes on which they depend for functioning are social ones. We 
have seen that there is no fully working human brain without the 
presences of other brains. The functioning brain is social in the sense 
that any given brain is completely dependent on other brains for its 
development. Without question, the synaptic brain is contained in 
our individual skulls but the intangible thought processes which 
these synapses make possible depend on a social environment with 
other actors who are engaged in everyday public discourse and 
interaction (brothers quoted by FranKs, 2010, p. 38).”
To live in a social environment, to cooperate with others we need a common 
world to live in and act upon, in other words, we need a sense of shared reality.7 
This ’intersubjectivity’, the connection between separate brains is one of the 
most interesting research field of social neuroscience not only in the phases 
of development but also in contexts of everyday life. Below, I will present 
Franks’ account on mirror neurons and the question of intersubjectivity and 
then the review move on to the topics of language and metaphors again. 
à response [action]), the pragmatist gave primacy to the action. This means that we perceive 
the world according to our actions and tasks at hand. Using Franks own words: “Perception 
becomes a selective assessment of what action possibilities an object affords for our intentions. 
All perception is selective and it is our actions that select the relevant from the irrelevant in 
any particular context. The world is not known by passive camera-like imprints or images or 
representations of how it ’actually is.’ It is known by the human actions which it makes possible 
([emphasis in the original] Franks, 2010, p. 87).”
6  Danielle’s case is a well-documented, shocking but at the same time moving story. For those 
who are interested there is an excellent documentary site with interviews at http://www.
tampabay.com/specials/2008/reports/danielle/ (retrieved 12/08/2011). Danielle was adopted 
and now lives in a loving and trusting environment. She has developed significantly not shying 
away from human contact and touch anymore but it is dubious whether she will be able to use 
language at all. 
7  Christakis and Fowler calls humans „ultrasocial” animal and this is also true for our perception 
(2010, p. 265). There is significant evidence that our color vision also developed in order to be 
able to identify color changes in each other’s face signifying emotional changes. Our social life 
not only influenced how we think, how we make decisions in the present about the future but 
was also altered to some extent the way we perceive the world (ibid. 266-267). 
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intersubjectivity
Franks starts out his explanation on intersubjectivity by asking what a 
society would look like if we were all individualist empiricists. We might think 
that the source of our knowledge is basically direct observation. Traditional 
empirical epistemological thinking, argues the author, is highly compatible 
with individualistic societies with their asocial focus on the private. ‘Seeing 
is believing’ the saying goes while sociologists, social psychologists and 
behavioral economists all stress the point that quite often it is the other way 
around (Berger & LuCkmann, 1966; aronson, 2008; rogers, 2003; thaLer 
& sunstein, 2008; arieLy, 2008, 2010). Common beliefs, stereotypes often 
affect more how we perceive the world than our direct experience. As Franks 
put it about empiricism:
“Originally empiricism relied on fact, seen as in opposition to 
theory, and fact was gathered by the individual’s private senses. But 
to one person standing on a hill, the shape of a tree may look very 
different from that observed by a person up close to it. The problem 
with this is if we rely purely on observation, there would have to be 
two trees. That would be what pure observation gives in this case. If 
the empirical ‘world of appearance’ to the individual alone is all we 
accept, then the two persons are isolated from each other in their 
two different perceptual worlds (FranKs, 2010, p. 40).”
However, in all historical and cultural contexts people presupposed the 
existence of a common world. We cannot see two trees but we see one since 
we abstract the idea of the tree out of our sensory experience. We are also 
able to share the tree with others around us by talking about it. The belief that 
the tree is the same (regardless of our perspective in space and regardless of 
the lighting conditions by day or by night) shows our deeply seated need for 
believing in a common world. And the belief in the common world, writes 
Franks, is the sine quo-non of human connection and society itself (p. 40). 
Even if we all have differences about how we see the world, be these 
differences political, religious or scientific, we appeal to settle our differences 
in this presumably shared world abstracted from individual sensory 
experience. As Franks puts it “without the assumption of one common tree, 
discussants would have nothing to argue over (emphasis in the original, p. 
40-41).” Disagreement must be over the same subject matter or we would talk 
past each other without understanding each other at all. In theory, there would 
be no problem since everybody could retreat to his or her private world and 
cut or climb his or her own trees. Yet, in reality we are quite aware that if one 
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wants to cut the tree and the other wants to climb the tree there would be a 
conflict of interest between the parties involved as environmentalists’ actions 
like tree sitting highlight this point. 
We act upon the same world and we instinctively know this. Without this 
instinctive knowledge society, social life and social action could not exist. 
Intersubjectivity is then essential for human discourse and communication. 
In social scientific literature it is a truism that we share the world through 
linguistic communication. Language is the means through which we construct 
our reality and the social phenomenon of linguistic communication can 
explain both the universality of ‘intersubjectivity’ and the enormous variance 
of the realities constructed in different historical and cultural contexts 
(sChutz, [1932] 1967; Berger & LuCkmann, 1966; FouCauLt [1969] 1972). 
So, according to Franks,… 
“…the conclusion to the above is that the assumption of the 
common world arises out of human talk. This in turn is the answer 
to Simmel’s question of what makes society possible. We become 
part of each other through intersubjectivity and symbolic discourse 
(FranKs, 2010, p. 41).”
However, argues Franks, the fact that intersubjectivity is necessary for 
human conversation does not mean that it is caused by human conversation at 
the same time. This would be a tautological argument. However, a cause must 
always precede an event. According to Franks, the key to this enigma can be 
found in our neural wiring. Intersubjectivity is literally built into our bodies 
and can be explained by the human brain’s mirror neurons and our tendencies 
to imitate others. In the next section I will attempt to explain what mirror 
neurons are and how they contribute to our understanding of others. 
Mirror neurons and intersubjectivity
To support this reasoning, it is necessary to explain the function of a vital 
cell type of the brain in terms of the somatic background of intersubjectivity. 
These are the mirror neurons. The ‘mirror’ part in the expression explains a 
lot about their function implying that it has to do with others’ actions. The 
Society for Neuroscience introduces the topic as follows:
“You see a stranger stub her toe and you immediately flinch in 
sympathy. You watch a baseball outfielder run to catch a long 
fly ball and feel your heart racing and your leg muscles pumping 
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along with him. You notice a friend wrinkle up his face in disgust 
while tasting some food and suddenly your own stomach recoils at 
the thought of eating. This ability to instinctively and immediately 
understand what other people are experiencing has long baffled 
neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers alike. Recent 
research now suggests a fascinating explanation: brain cells called 
mirror neurons (sFn, 2008, p. 1).”
So mirror neurons are a special type of brain cell which have to do with 
imitation, empathy and understanding others. These special brain cells are 
a set of neurons discovered in the 1990’s in the premotor cortex of macaque 
monkeys8. On one occasion a researcher was reaching for his food, when 
he noticed that certain neurons started to fire in one of the monkeys’ brain. 
This area was exactly the same which became activated when the animal was 
making a similar hand movement (sFn, 2008). After this initial discovery 
extensive research was made about mirror neurons not only in other primates 
but also in humans. 
As Christian Keysers explains to us in an interview, what these special 
neurons show us is that we have mechanisms, in other words brain circuits, 
“transforming the sight of someone else’s action into the motor program that 
we would use to perform the same action (keysers, web)”. In order to elucidate 
this complex system for lay people, he gives the example of drinking saying 
that if we see someone take a glass of cold water and drink it on a hot summer 
day, we not only see her drink it, but we literally feel it in our body how good 
it would be to drink one ourselves.9
Coming back to the social scientific vocabulary, the existence and function 
of mirror neurons would prove that perception is a not a passive process of 
registering images of objects in the space around us. Perception and action are 
deeply interwoven since we are actually doing, in other words, reenacting in 
the motor cortex what we are watching. That also means that understanding 
involves much more than merely understanding symbols.
8  Premotor cortex is understood to be the brain part through which we control parts of our bodies 
in voluntary movements. 
9  I cannot help having the suspicion that this process might be a bit trickier in the everyday 
messiness of social situations. Consider, for example, a simple social interaction: a boxing 
match. One is hitting the other and the other is being hit. In such a situation, what is happening 
to our mirror neurons, in other words, how do we perceive these actions with our motor cortex? 
Who do we identify with and whose actions do we model in our brain? To understand this 
situation one might have to draw upon social factors like preferences, stereotypes and group-
belonging. This is even more valid when more actors are involved in social interactions. 
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Schutz’ illustration of how we understand others revisits Weber’s famous 
example of a man cutting wood. If we want to know what this man is doing we 
have to make an interpretative leap meaning that we have to put ourselves in 
his place. We can do this by drawing on our past experience. While doing this 
we use language and other meaningful signs which make the whole process 
easier. These signs are collectively shared resources acting as a source of 
bridge between minds (sChutz [1932] 1967; CaLhoun et al., 2007. p. 28). 
They allow us to connect our own experience to that of others.
Mirror neurons help us to understand the woodcutter not only at a symbolic 
level but also through our motor system. We match his observed movements 
with the axe with to the movements we ourselves could perform. Using the 
arguments of social neuroscientists, Franks highlights the fact that without a 
mirror neuron system we would still be able to make sensory depictions of 
others’ behavior. However, it would be much more difficult to know their 
intentions and to understand what they were really doing. Through our own 
motor competencies we can shortcut all the time-consuming deliberations 
about their possible intentions, expectations, and motivations.10 This system 
allows us to make judgments about others’ behavior immediately and 
accurately without necessary language use and without deliberate cognition. 
Using Franks’ words:
“Human society is made possible through this process.(…) Mirror 
neurons enable us to go further than observation of movements 
into a realm of understanding these movements, namely because 
on a preobjective level they are our movements too, and are laced 
with similar intentions. This is different from Mead’s solution to the 
problem of intersubjectivity and human connection. His role-taking 
was completely linguistic being focused on significant symbols and 
the self-conscious control of behavior (FranKs, 2010, p. 89).”
All in all, we do not only understand others through the mediation of 
language, signs and cognition but immediately and directly through our 
10  The article on the homepage of Society for Neuroscience writes about this in the following 
way: „Before the discovery of mirror neurons, scientists generally believed that our brains 
use logical thought processes to interpret and predict other people’s actions. Now, however, 
many have come to believe that we understand others not by thinking, but by feeling. For 
mirror neurons appear to let us ‘simulate’ not just other people’s actions, but the intentions 
and emotions behind those actions. When you see someone smile, for example, your mirror 
neurons for smiling fire up, too, creating a sensation in your own mind of the feeling associated 
with smiling. You don’t have to think about what the other person intends by smiling. You 
experience the meaning immediately and effortlessly (sFn, 2008, p. 1).”
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bodies. On the Society for Neuroscience’s webpage about mirror neurons 
there is experimental evidence shown that observing the same action, such as 
grasping a cup, in different contexts elicits different levels of mirror neuron 
activity. Our mirror neuron system responds differently if we see someone 
grasp a cup in order to drink or to clean it. This finding demonstrates that our 
mirror neuron system not only codes the observed action (“that’s a grasp”) but 
it also identifies the intention behind the action (“that’s a grasp to drink” or 
“that’s a grasp to clear the table”) (sFn, 2008, p. 2).
Metaphors and language
Even if we can understand others on a preverbal level without conscious 
thought and the use of language that does not mean that language would operate 
on a separate level detached from our bodies and from bodily movements. 
Neuroscience research demonstrates that language use and thinking using 
linguistic symbols is deeply intertwined with our bodies in several ways.
One aspect of this is what is called the ‘motor theory of speech perception’. 
This intimidating expression means that when we hear others speak we do not 
actually hear the sounds directly through our ears but we indirectly understand 
the meaning of the sounds by activating those parts of the motor cortex which 
are responsible for tongue movements, that is, “through making the same 
speech movements ourselves in the motor cortex (Franks, 2010, p. 96)”. In 
other words, we do not record sounds per se with our ears but we speak them 
to ourselves unconsciously in the motor cortex. As Franks puts it: listening to 
one talking also means doing the talk (p. 97).
This conclusion resulted from evidence found among war veterans who 
lost their sights. Mechanical devices were developed for them to transform 
written texts into sounds. It turned out that it is extremely hard for them to 
understand the text read aloud by a machine since they cannot translate the 
sounds with their bodies through their brain.11
Moreover, other studies show that understanding words associated with the 
movement of a particular body part such as “lick, kick, or pick are simulated 
in those respective parts of the primary motor cortex that activate respective 
11  Other studies showed that listening to words with a more accentuated sound resulted 
more tension in the tongue muscles. We say the words for ourselves with closed 
mouth. This also underpins the argument of psychologists and sociologists such as 
Vygostky and Mead that thinking is an internalized dialogue, or to put it differently, 
thinking can be viewed as speaking without uttering the words loudly. 
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movement in the tongue, feet, or fingers (Franks, 2010, p. 92).” That means 
that we use the same brain areas to move a particular body part and to 
understand words and expressions related to that body part.
Another aspect of language’s close relationship with the body is the 
frequent use of metaphors in all known languages. According to the author, 
metaphors contribute towards understanding intersubjectivity since many of 
our metaphors refer to experiences with our bodies and to its motor actions 
affecting the world. ‘Getting out’ of a project, being ‘hit’ with the news, 
‘reaching’ a goal and ‘grasping’ the meaning of these expressions are all 
examples of this phenomenon.
All of us know what these expressions mean because we know the meanings 
of the verbs ‘getting out’, hit’, ‘reach’ and ‘grasp’. We do these actions with 
our bodies and we also know how it feels to be ‘hit’, be ‘grasped’, ‘reached’ 
or stay alone in a car after everyone ‘got out’. If we use the expression ‘take 
the blows in a debate’, it ‘carries’ meaning through connecting concrete 
experience of our bodies to abstract notions. Referring the meaning back to 
the body gives sense to metaphors and makes the intersubjective meaning 
accessible to all who have already experienced what we refer to. 
Neuroscientists also used an old technique called the bouba/kiki test to 
illustrate this point. If people are asked which is called bouba and which is 
kiki in the diagram below, most will say bouba is the jaggy one, while kiki 
is the one with sharp edges. This is because, irrespective of the respondents 
native language, we all connect the sharp sounds to pointed, jaggy images 
while we connect soft sounds with rounded, curved visualizations. The fact 
that this response of participants seems to transcend language, and most of the 
people tested answered in the same way, represent universal and automatic 
tendencies of the human brain towards sense-making by metaphors (p. 53-
56).
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DiaGram 1. (ramachanDran & hubbarD, 2001, p. 19)12:
Another external evidence that intersubjectivity, the metaphorical nature of 
the language, and understanding others’ bodily experience through our own 
are closely related can be autism. In autism neither of these seem to work 
properly. While autism is not a unitary condition and there are many kinds 
and gradations there are general characteristics such as detachment, lack of 
social skills, the absence of eye contact with others, lack of interest in or 
understanding of others’ subjective worlds. These are also accompanied by 
difficulties in understanding metaphors: 
“Thus, a subset of autistic children told to ‘get a hold of themselves’ 
or to ‘get a grip’ might start grasping at their own bodies. Much of 
language learning consists of ‘taking a person’s meaning’ rather 
than taking them literally. Autistic children are often just not 
interested. Voices on the phone which ask, ‘Are your parents in?’ 
may be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ by an autistic child who 
would then hang up (FranKs, 2010, p. 96).”
What is quite characteristics of autistic children is that they fail to develop 
a ‘theory of other minds’, an understanding that the others also experience the 
world as they do and that they also have their own subjective understanding 
of the world. Without this they are not able to do any ‘mind-reading’ of others, 
without this they are not interested to attempt to decode emotions on the face 
of others. The fact that autistic people have difficulties in understanding 
metaphors and take language quite literally also signifies that the neural 
12  Adapted version of the bouba/kiki figures were retrieved at 18/08/2011 from: http://upload.
wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/e/e7/Booba-Kiki.svg/2000px-Booba-Kiki.svg.png 
9

DIAGRAM 1. (RAMACHANDRAN & HUBBARD, 2001, p. 19)12:
Another external vide ce that i tersubjectivity, the metaphorical nature of the language, and 
understanding others’ bodily xperience through our own are closely related can be autism. In 
autism neither of these seem to work properly. While autism is not a unitary condition and 
there are many kinds and gradations there are general characteristics such as detachment, lack 
of social skills, the absence of eye contact with others, lack of interest in or understanding of 
others’ subjective worlds. These are also accompanied by difficulties in understanding 
metaphors:  
“Thus, a subset of autistic children told to ‘get a hold of themselves’ or to ‘get a grip’ 
might start grasping at their own bodies. Much of language learning consists of ‘taking 
a person’s meaning’ rather than taking them literally. Autistic children are often just 
not interested. Voices on the phone which ask, ‘Ar  your parents in?’ may be answered 
with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ by an autistic child who w uld th n hang up (FRANKS, 2010, 
p. 96).” 
What is quite characteristics of autistic children is that they fail to develop a ‘theory of other 
minds’, an understanding that the others also experience the world as they do and that they 
also have their own subjective understanding of the world. Without this they are not able to do 
any ‘mind-reading’ of others, without this they are not interested to attempt to decode 
emotions on the face of others. The fact that autistic people have difficulties in understanding 
metaphors and take language quite literally also signifies that the neural infrastructure of 
empathy, shared meaning, intersubjectivity and metaphors are all related in our neural wiring. 
Concluding remarks - Possible convergences 
To conclude, it is worth reading about neuroscience for a sociologist especially i  the 
presentation of a fellow social scientist. Franks selected the most important issues in current 
neuroscientific research which might be of interest to all those studying social and social-
psychological issues. The result is a rich and detailed ‘thick description’ of social 
neuroscience and it  implicati ns to social science. This book is full o  highly stimulating 
themes and accounts of research projects connecting two fields, which could not be more 
distant. Nonetheless, it also should be mentioned that my selection of topics here does not 
cover the entire scope of knowledge gathered and presented in the book about issues such as 
the new unconscious, determinism and free will, parts and dimensions of the selfhood, the 
role of emotion in decision-making. My selection was biased by my own interest or rather 

12Adaptedversionofthebouba/kikifigureswereretrievedat18/08/2011from:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/e/e7/BoobaͲKiki.svg/2000pxͲBoobaͲKiki.svg.png
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infrastructure of empathy, shared meaning, intersubjectivity and metaphors 
are all related in our neural wiring.
concluding remarks - Possible convergences
To conclude, it is worth reading about neuroscience for a sociologist 
especially in the presentation of a fellow social scientist. Franks selected 
the most important issues in current neuroscientific research which might be 
of interest to all those studying social and social-psychological issues. The 
result is a rich and detailed ‘thick description’ of social neuroscience and its 
implications to social science. This book is full of highly stimulating themes 
and accounts of research projects connecting two fields, which could not 
be more distant. Nonetheless, it also should be mentioned that my selection 
of topics here does not cover the entire scope of knowledge gathered and 
presented in the book about issues such as the new unconscious, determinism 
and free will, parts and dimensions of the selfhood, the role of emotion in 
decision-making. My selection was biased by my own interest or rather 
fascination but after reading the book I know that selective perception also 
has its biological foundations. I am sure that other readers will find the book 
compelling although not necessarily because of the aspects I highlighted in 
this review. 
After giving the book its due acclaim, a few critical remarks might be made 
just to keep the balance (or maintain the image) of an objective reader. Firstly, 
in several paragraphs the text seems to be quite difficult to read since it is 
full of technical language like prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus, thalamus and 
amygdale. Although the author did introduce most of these concepts at some 
points, the frequent use could be overwhelming and the main argument seems 
to be lost in technical details sometimes. For sure, this is not a popular science 
book and Franks attempted to avoid ‘sociological reductionism’ of biological 
facts, yet, it came at a cost of a thicker text. 
My second remark is that the main title (Neurosociology) implies a very 
broad and promising framework in which the research results of social 
neuroscience are interpreted in terms of social science. Franks stays in the 
paradigm of symbolic interactionism and mainly discusses Mead’s ideas 
about gestures, action, perception and self. However, there are other social 
scientists who wrote extensively about the body as a social phenomenon – so 
it would be very interesting to see how Elias, Bourdieu, Foucault, Butler and 
other social scientists can be viewed and interpreted from the ‘other side of 
the mirror’. 
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Although, Douglas Massey, former president of the American Sociological 
Association, in the 2002 presidential address stated that neuroscience may 
be essential for contemporary sociology (Franks, 2010, p. 2), there are 
several reasons why the reader might have the suspicion that there will 
be no ‘neuroscientific turn’ (like the linguistic turn) in sociology as was 
one in cognitive psychology and in experimental economics resulting 
neuroeconomics.13 As Franks shows it in his book’s introduction, the unit of 
analysis, the methodological approach, theory, tradition and practice are all 
fundamentally different in the case of sociology and neuroscience. Franks, 
however, sees an opportunity in combining these two distinctively different 
fields:
“But herein could lie an advantage and that is to break us out of our 
comfortable sociological ‘assumptive order’ and develop insights 
which may have otherwise been impossible, or at least very difficult 
to develop. In hypothesis testing, construct and convergent validity 
are the most highly regarded methods of privileging a thesis. If 
different methods and different theoretical positions converge on 
the same findings their validity is enhanced (FranKs, 2010, p. 2).”
In my opinion, this is a little bit too modest as a program manifesto for 
a burgeoning new subfield of social science research. There must be other 
ways where sociology and neuroscience might converge apart from mutually 
reinforcing each other’s theories in an extra-disciplinary way. 
Before I started to write about Franks’ book, one of my friends showed me 
an article published in Nature about schizophrenia and the city (LeDerBogen et 
aL., 2011; kenneDy & aDoLPhs, 2011). The article is about a research project 
which found that the longer one lived in big cities the higher the possibility is 
that his or her neural activity under stress condition will be similar to those who 
suffer from schizophrenia. In this project social and neuroscientists cooperated 
and in the future they want to enhance their model’s reliability with further 
research involving social factors like subjective feeling of control, status and 
frequency of meeting with strangers. This is a good example where macro-
sociological factors are shown to have a strong influence on the workings of 
the mind. So, direct cooperation, building and testing theories together, in 
projects like this might be a possibility for the future of neurosociology. 
Another field where neurosociology might be influential is the terrain of 
13  To read more on neuroeconomics see: 
http://neuroeconomics.typepad.com/neuroeconomics/2003/09/neuroeconomics_.html 
[retireved 16/08/2011]
152 GÁBOR KIRÁLY
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2012) 
action theories. Taking into consideration the constraints of rational choice 
theory, analytical sociology in its DBO (Desires-Beliefs-Opportunities) 
model already try to incorporate several other factors in actors’ decision-
making process like emotions, preferences and heuristics (heDstrom, 2005). 
This as well as other ways of modeling social action and decision-making 
might benefit from reflecting on questions raised by topics such as the ‘new’ 
unconscious, determinism and free will, perception and the role of emotions 
in decision-making. As Franks’ book shows these issues are at the forefront 
of research in neuroscience.
At a more philosophical level, social epistemology can also be the topic 
where there are meeting points between sociology and neuroscience. Franks 
refers to Lakoff and Johnson at several points of his book since they have 
already highlighted that the metaphorical nature of mind and of language 
has its roots in bodily experience and actions (LakoFF & Johnson, 1980). 
Using neuroscience’s tools to understand in what way our categories of 
interpreting and perceiving the world are structured universally by the body 
and specifically by culture can be a research topic of pivotal importance for 
both disciplines.
All in all, I recommend this book to everyone who would like to know more 
about the biological foundations of our social nature. Whether this is a new 
step towards an interesting cooperation between equal partners or it is a just 
another, more subtle form of ‘biological imperialism’, is a question that the 
future will decide.
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